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DIRK TOMSA AND CHARLOTTE SETIJADI
New Forms of Political Activism in Indonesia
Redefining the Nexus between Electoral
and Movement Politics
ABSTRACT
This article argues that new personality-centric movements have redefined the nexus
between activism and electoral politics in Indonesia. It illustrates how these move-
ments have challenged the role of political parties and consultants in electoral cam-
paigning, and how their growing prominence may affect the future trajectory of
Indonesian politics.
KEYWORDS: elections, parties, movements, activism, Indonesia
INTRODUCTION
Once regarded by many as inherently antagonistic arenas of contestation,
formal electoral politics and the political activism of social movements are
now increasingly seen as closely intertwined. In established Western democ-
racies, for example, issue-based movements routinely form alliances with like-
minded candidates or parties to complement the campaign efforts of these
political actors through informal activism. Meanwhile, in countries where
democratization began more recently, linkages between movements and elec-
tions also exist, even though the programmatic identities of parties and
individual candidates are usually less clearly deﬁned. In the absence of strong
and enduring ideological afﬁnities, alliances between parties and movements
often take the form of short-lived, personality-driven movements that mobi-
lize support for or against individual candidates during election campaigns.
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This article examines how such personality-driven activism is shaping the
nexus between electoral politics and less formalized movement politics in
Indonesia. In this Southeast Asian country, free and fair elections have been
held since 1999, but the ﬁrst notable example of this new type of political
activism did not occur before the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election,
when a rigidly organized campaign for a pair of underdog candidates—
Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and his running mate, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama
(Ahok)—morphed into a broad-based movement for political change. Sub-
sequently, the 2014 presidential election and the 2017 election for governor
of Jakarta were also shaped decisively by the activism of non-party actors,
while political parties played only marginal roles.
This article conceptualizes these new forms of campaign activism as ‘‘elec-
toral movements.’’ Although these movements lacked a radical social agenda
and the organization of a durable grassroots network, they can nevertheless be
classiﬁed as movements because they exhibited key elements of a typical
movement, including a conﬂictual orientation toward an opponent; a collec-
tive identity based on common values, beliefs, and goals; and a repertoire of
collective action.1 Against this background, the article utilizes analytical tools
from a conceptual framework developed by McAdam and Tarrow2 and puts
forward three main arguments. First, the new candidate-focused activism has
added a new dimension to electoral campaigning in Indonesia, which is
otherwise dominated by professional consultancies and the rampant use of
money politics. Second, new electoral movements are posing a challenge to
the supremacy of political parties in electoral contests, as they not only
complement but often take over important functions that are conventionally
regarded as the domain of political parties. Third, these electoral movements
are both products of broader regime dynamics as well as potential determi-
nants of the future trajectory of Indonesia’s current democratic regime.
Following this introduction, the article gives an overview of the growing
literature that examines the nexus between movement politics and elections.
It then proceeds to map the evolution of the new electoral activism in
Indonesia, from its beginnings in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election to
1. These are the key characteristics of a social movement as deﬁned by Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘‘Social
Movements,’’ in Daniele Caramani (ed.), Comparative Politics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011): 293.
2. DougMcAdam and Sidney Tarrow, ‘‘Ballots and Barricades: On the Reciprocal Relationship
between Elections and Social Movements,’’ Perspectives on Politics 8:2 (2010): 529–42.
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the 2014 presidential election and its most recent manifestations in the 2017
Jakarta election. Apart from highlighting how these movements blended top-
down organization with bottom-up mobilization, these early sections of the
article also trace the different motivations that prompted so-called relawan
(volunteers) to participate in the movement’s activities. In the next part, the
article analyzes in detail how this new election-focused political activism has
continuously redeﬁned the nexus between movement politics and elections
in Indonesia. Particular attention is paid to the impact on electoral campaign-
ing, the relationship between movements and parties, and the implications of
the new activism for broader regime dynamics. The article then investigates
the reasons for the emergence of the new political activism before concluding
with a critical assessment of the prospects for this new kind of activism to
spread to other elections.
ELECTORAL VERSUS CONTENTIOUS POLITICS
Electoral politics and the informal political activism of social movements have
long ceased to be analytically separate ﬁelds of inquiry. According to Gold-
stone, ‘‘Social movements constitute an essential element of normal politics
in modern societies, and . . . there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary
between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics.’’3 Nevertheless,
systematic analyses of exactly how electoral politics and social movements
have linked to one another remained somewhat scarce for a long time,
conﬁned largely to links between labor unions and socialist/social-
democratic parties or environmental activists and Green parties. In recent
years, however, more and more scholars have turned their attention to other
types of linkages that connect movement activism to the party-dominated
arena of electoral competition.
In one prominent contribution to the debate, McAdam and Tarrow sug-
gested probing the nexus between elections and social movements through
a multidimensional framework comprising a range of distinctive linkage
mechanisms.4 According to the authors, the ﬁrst of these linkage mechanisms
consists of movements’ development and use of innovative forms of collective
3. Jack A. Goldstone, ‘‘Bridging Institutionalized and Noninstitutionalized Politics,’’ in Jack A.
Goldstone (ed.), States, Parties and Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003): 2.
4. McAdam and Tarrow, ‘‘Ballots and Barricades.’’
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action that might later be adopted as campaign strategies by political parties
and candidates. Second, movements can inﬂuence electoral contests through
direct participation in elections, in the form of membership in existing
electoral coalitions, by nominating movement ﬁgures for political ofﬁce, or
by forming their own parties. Movements can also mobilize voters into
various election-related activities, such as voter registration or election mon-
itoring, as well as post-election protests and demonstrations. Beyond the
immediate electoral process, movements can cause or exacerbate ﬁssures
within parties that compete in elections. Finally, the nature of movement
activism and its potential to have an impact on electoral politics can also be
linked to broader shifts in overarching regime structures, which at times play
a prominent role in electoral campaigns.5
McAdam and Tarrow use an example of American politics to apply their
approach empirically, and indeed many other works in this growing literature
focus on the United States and other established Western democracies.6
Gradually, though, comparative and single-case studies from democracies
in other regions have begun to enrich the debate. Authors like Van Cott and
Becker, for example, traced the transformation of Latin American indigenous
movements into ethnic parties,7 while Thachil explored how Indian parties
use grassroots activists and social movements to mobilize voters from unlikely
constituencies.8 Another prominent strand of this new literature has emerged
in the study of competitive authoritarian regimes. Bunce and Wolchik, for
instance, examined electoral outcomes in several Central and Eastern Euro-
pean states, arguing that the crucial variable that deﬁned whether incumbent
leaders (or their handpicked candidates for succession) could be defeated
at the ballot box was the willingness and ability of opposition parties to
5. Ibid.: 533.
6. Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su, ‘‘The Political Consequences
of Social Movements,’’ Annual Review of Sociology 36 (2010): 287–307; Dana R. Fisher, ‘‘Youth
Political Participation: Bridging Activism and Electoral Politics,’’ Annual Review of Sociology 38
(2012): 119–37; Daniel Kreiss, Taking Our Country Back: The Crafting of Networked Politics from
Howard Dean to Barack Obama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Daniel Schlozman, When
Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2015).
7. Donna Lee van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); Marc Becker, Pachakutik: Indigenous Movements and Electoral Politics in
Ecuador (Lanham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 2011).
8. Tariq Thachil, ‘‘Embedded Mobilization: Nonstate Service Provision as Electoral Strategy in
India,’’ World Politics 63:3 (2011): 434–69.
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collaborate with political activists, both domestic and from abroad, in
devising innovative campaign strategies and, if necessary, to support public
protests.9 Similarly, LeBas’ analysis of party-building in three competitive
authoritarian states in Africa highlights the signiﬁcance of linkages between
labor movements and opposition parties in determining prospects for elec-
toral success.10
This article builds on many insights from the literature, but shifts the focus
to Indonesia, a country that is neither a consolidated democracy nor a com-
petitive authoritarian regime. As a relatively new electoral democracy, Indo-
nesia’s current regime is characterized by the often contentious interplay
among a frequently reiterated public narrative of good government and
democratic reform, a deeply entrenched group of oligarchic elites who use
democratic procedures only as an instrument to defend their wealth, and
a constantly evolving but still inefﬁcient set of political institutions that have
largely failed to ensure accountability and transparency. In this regime,
democracy and oligarchy coexist; elections are held regularly and are generally
free and fair, but many of the participating parties are controlled by extremely
wealthy elites, so that social movements and other political activists have long
found it difﬁcult to inﬂuence campaign agendas and electoral outcomes from
outside the party system.11
A number of activists, including human rights advocates, women’s rights
campaigners, and labor activists, have responded to this situation by running
for parliament in the hope of achieving their political objectives from within
established institutional channels.12 Others have chosen to remain outside
formal party politics but routinely get involved in elections as members of
9. Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘‘Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability
in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,’’ World Politics 62:1 (2010): 43–86.
10. Adrienne LeBas, From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
11. For competing views on to what extent oligarchic elites dominate Indonesian politics, see the
various contributions in Michele Ford and Thomas B. Pepinksy (eds.), Beyond Oligarchy: Critical
Exchanges on Political Power and Material Inequality in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2014).
12. Teri L. Caraway, Michele Ford, and Hari Nugroho, ‘‘Translating Membership into Power at
the Ballot Box? Trade Union Candidates and Worker Voting Patterns in Indonesia’s National
Elections,’’ Democratization 22:7 (2015): 1296–1316; Amalinda Savirani, ‘‘Bekasi, West Java: From
Patronage to Interest Group Politics?’’ in Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati (eds.), Electoral
Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism at the Grassroots (Singapore: NUS
Press, 2016): 184–202.
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‘‘success teams,’’ the ubiquitous groupings of campaign advisors, patronage
dispensers, and brokers that assemble around candidates in the run-up to
elections. Linkages between movement politics and elections therefore do
exist, but like many other facets of Indonesia’s political and associational
landscape, these linkages tend to be fragmented, ad hoc, and often aimed
at material rewards rather than political goals.
NEW ELECTORAL MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA
Against this background, the recent surge in volunteerism, creative activism,
and mass mobilization during election campaigns marks a signiﬁcant shift
from the prevalent patterns in the linkages between movement politics and
elections. It is closely related to the rise of populism in Indonesian politics,
which has become manifest in both national and local elections in recent
years.13 As public frustration about political parties and the ineffectiveness of
existing institutions continues to spread, activists and ordinary citizens alike
are increasingly throwing their support behind candidates who are perceived
as political outsiders and whose mere candidacy already poses a challenge to
entrenched elites. Thus, beginning in 2012, a new form of political activism
emerged in Indonesia, an activism that has since repeatedly constituted itself
in the form of electoral movements created with the distinct goal of support-
ing an individual candidate to win an election, especially for executive ofﬁces
such as governor or president. In 2017, this focus on individual candidates
took a new turn as some activists—in this case Islamist activists—mobilized
not in support of but in opposition to a certain candidate.
Movements that emerge to push for or against the election of individual
politicians are of course common in populist politics. More often than not,
they pursue an agenda of radical change and challenge existing norms and
values in a prevailing regime. In Latin America, for example, the wave of
leftist populism that inspired the electoral campaigns of Evo Morales in
Bolivia and Hugo Cha´vez in Venezuela emerged directly out of the conten-
tious politics of social movements. In Indonesia, however, the ﬁrst instances
13. Vedi R. Hadiz, ‘‘A New Islamic Populism and the Contradictions of Development,’’ Journal
of Contemporary Asia 44:1 (2014): 125–43; Abdul Hamid, ‘‘Jokowi’s Populism in the 2012 Jakarta
Gubernatorial Election,’’ Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33:1 (2014): 85–109; Marcus
Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: Jokowi’s Rise, Democracy and Political Contestation, Policy
Studies No. 72 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2015).
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of these new electoral movements were somewhat different. Neither the
Jakarta Baru (New Jakarta) movement that supported Jokowi and his run-
ning mate Ahok in the 2012 Jakarta election, nor the various volunteer groups
that formed the backbone of the pro-Jokowi movement in the 2014 presi-
dential election advocated radical change. In fact, these ﬁrst two electoral
movements could be seen as attempts to salvage rather than challenge the
prevailing regime, as Jokowi was widely seen as a ‘‘new hope’’ for Indonesia’s
fading reform narrative.
In 2017, remnants of these movements tried to mobilize again when
Jokowi’s former deputy and by then incumbent governor of Jakarta, Ahok,
began to prepare his re-election bid. But the Ahok campaign struggled to
spread beyond a small core of activists. Instead, the nexus between electoral
and movement politics was redeﬁned by Ahok’s opponents, who successfully
shifted the epicenter of the campaign to the streets and mosques of Jakarta,
where they eventually spawned a movement of their own. Deﬁned by racially
and religiously motivated opposition to Ahok, this movement eventually
paved the way for the election of Anies Baswedan, an Islamic intellectual
who once enjoyed a reputation as a moderate but in this election openly
courted radical Islamists and their elite backers.
Taken together, the two Jakarta elections and the presidential election
sandwiched between them had a signiﬁcant impact on the relationship
between electoral and movement politics in Indonesia. Before analyzing this
impact in more detail, however, it is necessary to outline the basic character-
istics of the various movements.
THE JOKOWI VOLUNTEERS: TWO ELECTIONS, ONE MOVEMENT?
In 2012, the Jakarta gubernatorial election made international headlines when
incumbent governor and poll favorite Fauzi Bowo was defeated in a second-
round run-off by his challenger Jokowi, the then relatively unknown mayor
of Solo. Once inaugurated, the new governor and his ethnic Chinese deputy,
Ahok, devoted substantial efforts to sharpening their public image. Within
a year, Jokowi had become a media sensation and the ﬁrm favorite for
the 2014 presidential election.14 In that election, Jokowi faced off against
14. Ross Tapsell, ‘‘Indonesia’s Media Oligarchy and the ‘Jokowi Phenomenon’,’’ Indonesia 99
(April 2015): 29–50.
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controversial former army general Prabowo Subianto, an ‘‘oligarchic popu-
list’’15 whose campaign revolved around aggressive nationalist and at times
anti-democratic rhetoric. When Jokowi won the election, on July 9, 2014, he
became the ﬁrst president of the democratic era who came from outside
Jakarta’s established elite. His victory also meant that Ahok became the ﬁrst
ethnic Chinese governor of Jakarta, as he automatically succeeded the depart-
ing Jokowi.
There were a range of similarities between Jokowi’s campaign for Jakarta
governor in 2012 and his presidential campaign in 2014. In both elections
Jokowi took on an opponent with far better connections to Jakarta’s elite,
and in both he relied primarily on his carefully constructed image as a humble
man of the people to defeat his opponents. Moreover, in both elections
Jokowi was able to overcome the problem of an ineffective party machinery
thanks to the combined help of dedicated volunteer groups, political con-
sultants, and selected donors.16 Such reliance on non-party support networks
may not be unusual in Indonesian elections, but the sheer magnitude of
volunteer activism that complemented the ofﬁcial campaigns in both elec-
tions was unprecedented. It is therefore fair to say that even though Jokowi
was by no means averse to conventional means of campaign support from
consultants and oligarchs, he would not have won either of the two elections
without the help of a huge armada of volunteers who dedicated enormous
time and resources to the campaign.
According to Hasan Nasbi, the political consultant who organized the 2012
campaign for Jokowi, there were a number of reasons why volunteers became
a central feature of that campaign.17 First, momentum for the fairly unknown
Jokowi needed to be created in Jakarta long before the ofﬁcial campaign
period began, but Jokowi himself could do little to provide that momentum
because he spent most of his time in Solo, where he had to fulﬁll duties as the
city’s mayor. Second, Jokowi’s status as a rank outsider precluded him from
mobilizing large funds from Jakarta’s entrenched oligarchs, so he was unable
15. Edward Aspinall, ‘‘Oligarchic Populism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian
Democracy,’’ Indonesia 99 (2015): 1–28.
16. Ironically, his gubernatorial campaign was ﬁnanced to a large degree by the very forces he
would later compete against in the presidential election, namely Prabowo Subianto and his billionaire
brother Hasyim Djojohadikusumo. Jeffrey Winters, ‘‘Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,’’ In-
donesia 96 (October 2013): 24.
17. Hasan Nasbi interview, Jakarta, May 16, 2016.
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to build and maintain an expensive campaign machine. Third, Jokowi ini-
tially received fairly little airtime in the mainstream media, because incum-
bent Governor Fauzi Bowo controlled access to most media outlets.18 An
innovative grassroots campaign driven by volunteers and social media activ-
ism therefore not only gave meaning to the campaign theme of Jakarta Baru
but was also born out of necessity.
And so, volunteers were recruited from a broad cross-section of society,
comprising people from very different socioeconomic, religious, and ethnic
backgrounds. Some were trained by Nasbi’s consultancy to work effectively
for the campaign, while others became involved without having any connec-
tions to the formal campaign. At last, a potpourri of volunteer groups
emerged that engaged in a wide range of activities, including door-to-door
community visits, organization of media events, countering smear cam-
paigns, and using social media to communicate with voters. Two years later,
during the presidential campaign, there were echoes of this diversity in the
new pro-Jokowi movement, but there were also some major differences from
the Jakarta Baru campaign.
For example, in 2012 the broad support movement that eventually helped
Jokowi get elected emerged only toward the end of the campaign, as an
effective by-product of an immaculately executed campaign strategy devised
by a professional consultancy ﬁrm. It was therefore reminiscent of the famous
ﬁrst presidential campaign of Barack Obama in 2008, in which, as Ganz put
it, ‘‘a movement took shape within a political campaign, the ‘movement to
elect Barack Obama’.’’19 The dynamics of the Jakarta 2012 campaign were
remarkably similar, as the movement to elect Jokowi and his deputy Ahok
also only took shape as their professionally planned campaign unfolded.
In 2014, by contrast, Jokowi already enjoyed broad public support before
he was nominated; in fact he was nominated precisely because he had such
broad public support. Volunteer groups to support Jokowi had therefore
already emerged long before the presidential election. Moreover, in another
departure from the 2012 campaign, many of the new groups did not originate
at the grassroots or in the headquarters of a centrally planned campaign, but
were founded by well-connected political operators who only jumped on the
18. Ibid.
19. Marshall Ganz, ‘‘Organizing Obama: Campaign, Organizing, Movement,’’ paper prepared
for the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 2009.
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relawan bandwagon because of Jokowi’s leading position in the polls. If in
2012 no volunteers except formal witnesses at polling stations on election day
were paid,20 the 2014 campaign involved many ‘‘volunteers’’ who did receive
material rewards for their activism.21
Nevertheless, spontaneity, enthusiasm, and idealistic commitment were
still crucial components of the volunteerism that marked the 2014 campaign.
In particular, despite the presence of many pragmatic opportunists in the
movement, there was still a strong element of pro-democracy activism,
inspired partly by Jokowi’s reform-oriented track record and partly by the
authoritarian tendencies of his opponent. Several volunteer organizations,
including Almisbat, Projo, Duta Jokowi, and Seknas Jokowi, were formed
or supported by democracy, human rights, and women’s activists. In the ﬁnal
weeks before the election, when Prabowo was rapidly closing the gap in the
polls, these activists repeatedly reminded the public of what was at stake in
this election, for example by recalling the sacriﬁces that were made in 1998 to
bring democratization to Indonesia.
One such volunteer was Ririn Sefsani, a long-time pro-democracy activist
who is now program manager for Kemitraan (Partnership), a not-for-proﬁt
organization that advocates government reform. Hailing from Solo herself,
she had personally known and supported Jokowi since he was the mayor of
Solo. For Ririn, the honest and hard-working ﬁgure she had seen in Jokowi
since his mayoral days was exactly what Indonesia needed to further its
reform, and that was why she supported him in 2014:
I ﬁrst met Jokowi when my organization at the time organized a public debate,
and when he [Jokowi] arrived, I didn’t recognize that he was the mayor,
because he was this skinny guy who just looked so ordinary! Since then I have
followed his work, policies, and character, and I felt strongly that this was the
ﬁgure that we activist groups have been waiting for. . . . Jokowi is of course not
perfect, and his policies are imperfect too, but he at least embodies the kind of
reform spirit that we [activists] have been campaigning for since 1998. . . .
Jokowi was a contrast to Foke [Fauzi Bowo] in Jakarta in 2012, and he was even
20. Ahmad Suaedy, ‘‘The Role of Volunteers and Political Participation in the 2012 Jakarta
Gubernatorial Election,’’ Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33:1 (2014): 122–23.
21. For example, a number of the ‘‘elite volunteers’’ were later rewarded for their support with
appointments in state-owned enterprises and other inﬂuential posts. ‘‘16 Politisi dan Relawan Jokowi
jadi Komisaris, Bahaya Menanti BUMN’’ [16 politicians and Jokowi volunteers become commis-
sioners, danger awaits state-owned enterprises], Kompas, April 12, 2015.
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more of a contrast to Prabowo in 2014, so it was very important for me and
other activist friends to go all out to support him then.22
PRO- AND ANTI-AHOK MOVEMENTS IN THE 2017 JAKARTA
ELECTION
Signiﬁcantly, this underlying current of pro-democracy activism was far less
pronounced in the run-up to the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, when
former members of the Jakarta Baru movement once again sought to mobi-
lize an electoral movement, this time in support of Jokowi’s former deputy in
Jakarta, Ahok. Calling themselves Teman Ahok (Friends of Ahok), these
young activists did not support Ahok’s re-election bid because they regarded
him as an icon of democratic reform, but rather because of his reputation as
an independent maverick politician who was not afraid to take on entrenched
bureaucrats and party elites. According to Teman Ahok spokesperson Amalia
Ayuningtyas, the volunteer group decided to mobilize because they wanted
Ahok to take his independent status to the next level by contesting the Jakarta
election as a formally independent candidate:
We started Teman Ahok because we believed that Ahok was the right person for
Jakarta. We have had many governors in the past who did not do much for
Jakartans because they were either corrupt or beholden to party interests. . . .But
Ahok quit political parties that he could not agree with, and as an independent,
we believed that he has done many things for Jakarta, making hard decisions that
would have been difﬁcult if he was with a party. . . . So we wanted him to stay
independent, so he can keep making Jakarta better. At a meeting with Ahok, we
told him that we’d get him the 1 million identity cards [kartu tanda penduduk,
KTP] he needed to go forward as an independent candidate. Ahok at the time
said ‘‘go ahead, do it cleanly,’’ and so that was how we began.23
By June 2016, Teman Ahok had successfully collected a million KTPs, and
for several weeks, Ahok seemed poised to become an independent candidate.
However, Teman Ahok’s hopes to mobilize a broader movement suffered
a major blow when Ahok eventually declared that he would run as a party
candidate after all. This change of mind disappointed many Ahok supporters,
especially those who had volunteered their time during Teman Ahok’s KTP
22. Ririn Sefsani interview, Jakarta, July 4, 2017.
23. Amalia Ayuningtyas interview, Jakarta, May 13, 2016.
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drive. Many even accused the governor of taking advantage of Teman Ahok’s
efforts and using their successful KTP collection as a bargaining chip to
eventually secure political-party support. However, at least in public, Teman
Ahok leaders such as Aditya Yogi Prabowo (Bowo) said that they had not lost
faith in Ahok and would continue to support his campaign, even after he
abandoned his independent candidacy:
Of course, we were disappointed when we ﬁrst heard that Ahok had decided to
go with the political parties. We put so much effort into the KTP collection so
that Ahok could go independent. . . .But in the end, what we wanted was for
him to run, so he could be our governor again for a second term, and the 1
million KTPs we collected proved that he had the people’s mandate, so from
this perspective, it wasn’t all for nothing.24
If Ahok’s decision to run as a party candidate was a blow to the ﬂedgling pro-
Ahok movement, the knockout came shortly afterwards, when an edited
video of Ahok allegedly insulting Al-Maidah verse 51 of the Qur’an, emerged
and was widely circulated on social media. The video showed Ahok during
a campaign event on September 27, 2016, where he told a group of civil
servants that they should not be fooled by people who referred to Al-
Maidah 51 when urging them not to vote for him.25 The footage caused
outrage among many Muslims and soon led to mass anti-Ahok demonstra-
tions and formal charges of blasphemy against the Christian governor.26
The blasphemy allegations completely changed the tone and atmosphere
of Ahok’s campaign. With Ahok distracted by the trial, the campaign went
into damage-control mode and became increasingly disorganized and reac-
tionary. Ahok’s volunteers, including Teman Ahok, tried to defend him on
social media and through grassroots door-knocking campaigns that empha-
sized the governor’s track record of building mosques, and other pro-Islam
social activities. However, their campaigns failed, because they did not gain
traction outside of Ahok’s existing supporter groups. And while Teman Ahok
failed to mobilize a new movement, Ahok’s detractors seized the momentum
24. Aditya Yogi Prabowo interview, Jakarta, September 21, 2017.
25. The verse is often interpreted by Indonesian Muslim leaders as a call to prevent the rule of
non-Muslims over Muslims. During the Jakarta election campaign, it was used by Ahok’s political
opponents to encourage people not to vote for him.
26. Charlotte Setijadi, ‘‘Religious Freedom on Trial in Indonesia,’’ East Asia Forum, January 5,
2017.
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generated by the blasphemy case to galvanize unprecedented support for
a new type of electoral movement that was aimed not at backing but at
opposing a certain candidate.
Led by hardline Muslim groups such as the Islamic Defenders’ Front
(Front Pembela Islam) and the Indonesian branch of the pan-Islamist Hizbut
Tahrir (Party of Liberation) and tacitly condoned by Ahok’s opponents in the
gubernatorial race, the anti-Ahok movement grew rapidly, mobilizing
immense support by means of anti-Chinese and anti-Christian rhetoric. As
Sigit Widiyastono of Teman Ahok explains, although many of Ahok’s
volunteers tried to defend their candidate, they were no match for the extent
of the anti-Ahok Islamic mobilization that went on during campaign season:
We were completely defeated in terms of volunteer mobilization, especially
during the second round of the election. Teman Ahok and other volunteers
went door-knocking around neighborhoods and went on social media cam-
paigns, but the other side had a presence at pretty much every mosque, musholla
[small Islamic prayer space], and Qur’an reading group in Jakarta. Do you know
how many mosques there are in Jakarta? It was impossible to match them.27
The main beneﬁciary of the groundswell in anti-Ahok protests was Anies
Baswedan, who eventually won the gubernatorial election after forging an
alliance with the hardline Muslim organizations that had organized the mass
demonstrations against Ahok. In the end, Ahok not only lost the election but
was also convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to two years in jail. But while
his demise was sealed at the ballot box and in the courts, it is important to
note that the main driver behind it was the unprecedented mass mobilization
in the streets. The anti-Ahok movement may have differed from the pro-
Jokowi movements and the abortive pro-Ahok movement in the sense that its
main goal was to prevent rather than achieve the election of a certain candi-
date, but there were nevertheless important parallels between all these move-
ments, as the following section will illustrate.
REDEFINING THE MOVEMENT–ELECTION NEXUS IN INDONESIA
Although the exact extent of the various movements’ impact on the eventual
election results may not be measurable in numbers, most observers agree that
27. Sigit Widiyastono interview, Jakarta, July 5, 2017.
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political activism and mass mobilization did play a signiﬁcant role in deter-
mining the outcomes of the polls.28 It is not the objective of this article to
conﬁrm or refute such assessments, for example through a quantitative mea-
surement of the movements’ inﬂuence. Rather, the contention here is that
the emergence of this new form of activism has reshaped the nature of
electoral competition in Indonesia more generally, especially in regard to
campaigning, the relations between political parties and non-party actors,
and the interplay between broader regime dynamics and electoral politics.
New Forms of Collective Action and Mass Mobilization
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant contribution the new electoral movements have
made to redeﬁning the nexus between political activism and electoral politics
in Indonesia has been the extensive use of online resources and social media.
Until the 2012 Jakarta election, the Internet had been poorly utilized by
Indonesian parties and candidates, but Jokowi’s volunteers quickly realized
the potential for political mobilization through Facebook, Twitter, and You-
Tube. Thus, in both the 2012 Jakarta campaign and the 2014 presidential
campaign, large numbers of dedicated netizens and ‘‘produsers’’ (media users
who both consume and produce content) waged an effective cyberwar against
Jokowi’s opponents, often through ingenious references to popular culture.29
An umbrella organization called jasmev.com was formed in 2012 (and re-
named jasmev2014.com for the presidential election) to coordinate many of
these online activities, reaching thousands of registered members in 2014.30
Numerous other ad hoc groups that did not register with jasmev.com also
spread news about Jokowi and his campaign through new websites, Twitter
and Facebook postings, and WhatsApp groups. Toward the end of the
campaign, a range of prominent public ﬁgures made a last-minute appeal
to undecided voters through YouTube clips titled ‘‘60 detik buat kamu yang
masih bingung’’ (‘‘60 seconds for those of you who are still confused’’).
Signiﬁcantly, online activism did not end on election day, at least not in
2014. Once the ballots were cast in the presidential election, fears about fraud
28. Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism; Suaedy, ‘‘Role of Volunteers’’; Tim Lindsey, ‘‘Ahok’s
Defeat Bodes Ill for the Future,’’ Indonesia at Melbourne, April 20, 2017.
29. Tapsell, ‘‘Indonesia’s Media Oligarchy’’: 38.
30. Ririn Sefsani and Patrick Ziegenhain, ‘‘Civil-Society Support: A Decisive Factor in the
Indonesian Presidential Elections in 2014,’’ Asien 136 (July 2015): 26.
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quickly spread, prompting an unprecedented wave of crowdsourcing projects
to ensure transparency during the vote count. The most prominent of these
projects was KawalPemilu.org (Guard the Election), a website set up by tech-
savvy Indonesians living abroad who were concerned about the accuracy of
the ballot counting by the General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan
Umum). Within just a few days, KawalPemilu had used Facebook to mobi-
lize around 700 volunteers to manually tally the commission’s tabulation
forms from all over the country—a huge exercise involving forms from
486,000 polling stations across the archipelago. Thus, in a ﬁnal demonstra-
tion of strength and wit, pro-Jokowi volunteers once again utilized the new
opportunities of the Internet to leave their mark on the electoral process.
While netizens and produsers formed the most creative and innovative part
of the pro-Jokowi movement, they were assisted by a large number of devoted
volunteers who complemented the cyberwar on the ground. By organizing
local campaign events, engaging citizens in neighborhood discussions, and
collecting donations for the campaign, these volunteers were often more
effective in mobilizing grassroots support for Jokowi than the political parties
that had backed his nomination. Especially, the large number of individual
donations collected from more than 40,000 individual donors in the 2014
presidential campaign stood out as a major achievement. According to Sny-
der, ‘‘This ‘Obama-style’ fundraising campaign, to collect small donations
from a broad swath of everyday citizens, is a novel concept in national-level
Indonesian politics and one that has struggled to gain popularity . . . until
now.’’31 While his opponents Fauzi Bowo (in 2012) and Prabowo (in 2014)
ﬁnanced their campaigns primarily through large business donations from
oligarchic elites, Jokowi’s volunteers successfully introduced crowdsourcing
to Indonesian elections.
In the run-up to the 2017 Jakarta election, Teman Ahok sought to emulate
many of the successful strategies of the Jokowi campaign, including the
‘‘Obama-style’’ grassroots fundraising. But after an auspicious start, it quickly
lost momentum after Ahok decided to abandon his independent candidacy.
As the parties moved to regain control of the campaign, the enthusiasm of
many volunteers waned. Although Teman Ahok and other grassroots sup-
porter groups continued to engage in social media campaigns, they were, in
31. Justin Snyder, ‘‘Campaign Finance, Strategy and Accountability,’’ New Mandala, July 18,
2014.
TOMSA AND SETIJADI / POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN INDONESIA  571
the words of Tapsell, ‘‘far less present, less rambunctious and less relevant in
this Jakarta election of 2017.’’32 Their irrelevance became particularly obvious
in the months after the blasphemy allegations, when attempts to bolster
Ahok’s declining popularity ratings through YouTube clips and solidarity
ﬂash-mobs failed to resonate with voters.
Instead, it was the anti-Ahok campaign that used social media most effec-
tively, especially through the spread of anti-Chinese and other inﬂammatory
fake news. Indeed, grassroots anti-Ahok social media campaigners were
extremely active and aggressive during the Jakarta election, with hardline
Islamist groups allegedly engaging an Islamic ‘‘cyber-army’’ to discredit Ahok
based on his religion and ethnicity. Reports about more allegedly blasphe-
mous statements by the governor and allegations that the Chinese govern-
ment was involved in Ahok’s campaign were widely spread on social media.33
Ahok’s opponent Anies Baswedan and his running mate Sandiaga Uno
denied any involvement in the creation of these online attacks:
Our team did not attack Ahok’s religion or race. But in many ways, we did not
need to, even if we wanted to. There were already so many anti-Ahok materials
out there on social media, our campaign decided to focus on my and Anies’
image as fun and approachable through the social media products we pro-
duced. Our campaign also had our own social media ‘‘army,’’ but we tried to
maintain a neutral image. . . .The religious aspects were done completely out-
side of our formal campaign.34
While Uno’s comments must be taken with a pinch of salt, it is true that once
the blasphemy allegations had surfaced, the anti-Ahok social media campaign-
ing, particularly by Islamist groups, was far more effective than the pro-Ahok
efforts. As will be outlined in the section below, much of the inefﬁciency and
failure of the pro-Ahok campaign can be attributed to the tensions between the
grassroots volunteer groups and the party campaigners who came in after Ahok
abandoned plans for an independent candidacy. The disorganization, break-
down in communication, competing interests, and differing visions ended up
creating more chaos in the already heavily attacked Ahok campaign.
32. Ross Tapsell, ‘‘‘Bottom-Up’ Campaigning Failed Ahok, and It Might Fail Jokowi,’’ New
Mandala, April 27, 2017.
33. Merlyna Lim, ‘‘Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal
Nationalism in Indonesia,’’ Critical Asian Studies 49:3 (2017): 411–27.
34. Sandiaga Uno interview, Jakarta, July 5, 2017.
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The Movement and the Parties
Apart from introducing new forms of collective action that were unheard of
in previous Indonesian elections, volunteers have also taken over many forms
of rather conventional campaign activities that otherwise would have been
the domain of political parties or candidate-sponsored success teams. By
going door to door, disseminating campaign material, and eventually mon-
itoring the voting process and the subsequent vote count, volunteers helped
out where political parties were either unable or unwilling to support the
campaign. According to Mietzner, the volunteer groups that supported Jo-
kowi in the 2014 presidential campaign were ‘‘an effective substitute’’ for
a party machine that did ‘‘little to campaign for Jokowi.’’35 By rectifying
many of the shortcomings of the formal campaign, they not only proved
to be the most reliable ‘‘coalition partner’’ for Jokowi, but also exposed deep
resentments within the actual electoral coalition against the candidate they
had ofﬁcially nominated.
Within this coalition of four parties, the biggest and most inﬂuential was
the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Per-
juangan, PDIP), which had already supported Jokowi’s candidacy for Jakarta
governor in 2012. Signiﬁcantly, Jokowi was a member of PDIP, but he did
not—and still does not—hold a position of inﬂuence in the party’s organi-
zational hierarchy. In fact, many members of the party’s central board around
the powerful chairwoman Megawati Sukarnoputri resented Jokowi’s rise
from small-town mayor in Central Java to Jakarta governor and then presi-
dential candidate, because they feared that the political newcomer from Solo
might disrupt traditional power networks within and beyond the party. For
those in the party who supported Jokowi, as well as several former PDIP
members who had fallen out with Megawati in earlier disputes, the lackluster
attitude of the party leadership was a key trigger to either join or establish
volunteer groups in the run-up to the presidential election. As the pro-Jokowi
movement grew in stature during the campaign, the tensions between vo-
lunteers and PDIP increased, as some party cadres deliberately tried to
undermine the volunteers’ campaign efforts.
By the time Jokowi commenced his presidency, the tensions between the
movement and the party were so high that some volunteer organizations,
35. Mietzner, Reinventing Asian Populism: 43.
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including Projo, Seknas Jokowi, and Duta Jokowi, formed a so-called Joint
Secretariat for a Participating Indonesia (Sekretariat Bersama Partisipasi
Indonesia), whose members then ﬂoated the idea of establishing a new party
dedicated purely to supporting Jokowi. But this never materialized, because
Jokowi knew too well that it would have only increased hostility from an
already antagonistic parliament. In fact, for many volunteers, their work was
done once the election was over.
In the 2017 Jakarta election, tensions between activists and parties reached
new heights when Teman Ahok pushed for their candidate to run as an
independent rather than a party nominee. The group’s activities and Ahok’s
apparent sympathy for an independent candidacy irritated Jakarta’s party
elites, leading to accusations that Teman Ahok sought to marginalize political
parties from electoral politics.36 Soon the volunteers found themselves at the
receiving end of fraud allegations, and Ahok himself felt the pressure as one of
his aides was implicated in a corruption scandal. In the end, the parties
convinced Ahok to abandon his plans for an independent candidacy.
According to Ahok’s former close advisor and volunteer coordinator,
Michael Sianipar, things changed as soon as the political parties took control.
Apparently, both Teman Ahok and Ahok’s long-time advisers were increas-
ingly excluded from campaign decisions once the party machinery kicked
into gear. Sianipar says that many of the parties’ campaign methods were at
odds with Ahok’s own political philosophies: ‘‘Ahok suddenly found himself
among all these new people he didn’t know, and no matter how much he
insisted on ‘no money politics,’ these political party operatives continued to
do it. . . .This made Ahok increasingly paranoid about how campaign funds
were being distributed, and because of that, the funds were distributed
inefﬁciently.’’37
If the gap between Ahok’s volunteers and the parties that nominated him
widened during the campaign, his opponents were far more successful in
closing ranks. As the anti-Ahok movement gathered momentum in the wake
of the blasphemy allegations, hardline Islamist organizations agitated in the
streets and in the online sphere; powerful party ﬁgures supporting Ahok’s
opponents were widely believed to provide the funds for the smear campaign.
36. ‘‘Tanggapi Teman Ahok, PDI-P Akan Lawan Deparpolisasi’’ [Responding to Teman Ahok,
PDIP will oppose marginalization of political parties], Kompas, March 8, 2016.
37. Michael Sianipar interview, Jakarta, July 4, 2017.
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Signiﬁcantly, however, even in this highly effective alliance between street-
level mobilization and elite machinations, it was the movement in the streets,
not the parties on the campaign trail, that most decisively inﬂuenced the
election result.
Elections, Movements and Regimes: Activists as Saviors and Challengers of
Indonesia’s Post-1998 Regime
Apart from introducing new campaign strategies to electoral politics and
taking over important functions that political parties were unable or unwill-
ing to fulﬁll, the volunteers and their new political activism were also a reﬂec-
tion of broader regime dynamics in Indonesia. In 2012 and 2014, they
epitomized a growing public discontent with the trajectory of the country’s
prevailing democratic regime, which since its inception in 1998 had been
shaped by the antagonistic relationship between public support for the
reform narrative of the pro-democracy movement and the predatory material
interests of a powerful oligarchy with deep roots in the preceding authori-
tarian regime. During the second presidential term of Jokowi’s predecessor,
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, this regime appeared increasingly vulnerable,
and many Indonesians felt that the balance between the pro-democracy
narrative and the material interests of the oligarchs was becoming more and
more tilted toward the latter.38
Against this background, the 2012 Jakarta election was a ﬁrst indication
that, if given the chance, the majority of voters were no longer prepared to
simply perpetuate the dominance of oligarchic apparatchiks such as Fauzi
Bowo. Nor were these voters willing to embrace the kind of neo-authoritarian
tendencies ﬂaunted by Prabowo Subianto in 2014 as an alternative to the
prevailing mix of oligarchy and democracy. What the volunteer activism in
support of Jokowi in 2012 and 2014 demonstrated was that while many
Indonesians wanted change, they only wanted moderate change, within the
parameters of the existing democratic structure.
Jokowi’s presidency, however, failed to deliver the kind of changes many of
his volunteers had hoped for. Instead, Indonesia’s democracy has become
even more fragile under his presidency, with the 2017 Jakarta election being
38. For a detailed analysis of the Yudhoyono years, see Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner, and
Dirk Tomsa (eds.), The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation (Sin-
gapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015).
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one, but certainly not the only, manifestation of this growing fragility. Ahok’s
political demise at the hands of an openly racist smear campaign signaled
a shift in successful mobilization patterns from creative pro-reform activism
to aggressive Islamist agitation. This growing Islamist inﬂuence in itself poses
a signiﬁcant challenge to the pluralist foundations of Indonesia’s democratic
regime, but arguably an even bigger threat lies in the fact that oligarchic elites
have readily embraced the Islamists and actively supported their contentious
politics in the streets. Should this alliance last until the 2019 election, it will
present another serious test for Indonesia’s now highly vulnerable democratic
regime.
REASONS FOR THE RISE OF ELECTORAL MOVEMENTS IN
INDONESIA
Having outlined how new forms of political activism have shaped the con-
tours of electoral politics in recent years, we will now analyze the reasons
behind this trend. This section traces the roots of the new electoral move-
ments in long-term factors such as the ever-increasing personalization of
electoral competition and the concurrent public dissatisfaction with rampant
money politics, but also argues that in order for these movements to trigger
genuine mass mobilization, a number of contingencies need to be in place.
The personalization of electoral politics in Indonesia has been well docu-
mented over the years.39 Two main features stand out. In parliamentary elec-
tions, the progressive switch from a closed-list proportional-representation
system (applied in 1999), to a partially open proportional-representation system
(applied in 2004), to a fully open-list proportional-representation system
(applied in 2009 and 2014) has facilitated money politics, intra-party compe-
tition, high party system fragmentation, and a public perception that individual
candidates matter more than party afﬁliation. In executive elections, mean-
while, the introduction of direct elections for president (in 2004), governors,
mayors, and district heads (in 2005) further intensiﬁed the focus on individual
39. Michael Buehler and Paige Johnson Tan, ‘‘Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian
Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province,’’
84 (2007): 41–69; Dirk Tomsa, ‘‘The Indonesian Party System after the 2009 Elections: Towards
Stability?’’ in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (eds.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia:
Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010): 141–59;
Andreas Ufen, ‘‘From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia,’’ South
East Asia Research 16:1 (2008): 5–41.
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politicians. The role of political parties quickly degenerated into little more
than gatekeeping in the nomination processes, as candidates were required
to be nominated by political parties or party coalitions. This situation has
changed little over the years, even though independent candidates have
been allowed to compete in local elections since 2007 (but not in presidential
elections).
The personalization of electoral politics has gone hand in hand with
immense public dissatisfaction with political parties. Numerous public opin-
ion surveys over the years have shown that political parties are among the least
trusted political organizations in Indonesia. Widely perceived as self-
interested and unprofessional in conducting their legislative duties, parties
stand as representative of the more general pathologies of Indonesia’s post-
1998 regime, especially corruption and predatory capture by super-rich oli-
garchs. Their tendency to collude over patronage rather than compete over
policies has earned them the reputation as a cartel, both in academic discourse
and in public debate in the Indonesian media.40 Beyond the national level,
most parties have only shallow organizational infrastructure, and especially in
the more remote parts of the Indonesian archipelago, their cohesion as an
organization is often dependent on clientelistic networks rather than party
identiﬁcation based on programmatic values.41 During election times, nomi-
nations for local executive posts or party lists in legislative elections are
routinely auctioned off to the highest bidder. And while some of these
characterizations have recently been challenged by scholars like Mietzner,42
public opinion of political parties in Indonesia remains overwhelmingly
negative.
Taken together, the personalization of electoral politics and the consis-
tently bad image of political parties have certainly facilitated the rise of
ostensibly non-mainstream politicians like Jokowi. But Prabowo—and
numerous other candidates in local elections—have also tried to present
themselves as political outsiders (some of them successfully). Yet practically
all of them, including Ahok in the 2017 Jakarta election, failed to mobilize
40. Dan Slater, ‘‘Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after
Democratic Transition,’’ Indonesia 78 (2004): 61–92.
41. Dirk Tomsa, Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the Post-Suharto Era
(London: Routledge, 2008).
42. Marcus Mietzner,Money, Power, and Ideology: Political Parties in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2013).
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a grassroots movement comparable to the pro-Jokowi movements. In other
words, personalization of electoral politics and anti-party sentiment among
the voting population may have created an enabling environment for new
electoral movements, but for the pro-Jokowi campaigns to turn into effective
mass movements, a number of other contingencies had to fall into place. In
identifying these contingencies, Lim’s work on social media activism (broadly
conceived, not related to elections) provides a helpful framework.43
Lim points out that despite the high number of Facebook and Twitter
users in Indonesia, online activists who try to use social media for political
struggles face signiﬁcant constraints when attempting to mobilize netizens
into active support for their campaigns. The most important factors shaping
the effectiveness of social media activism, she argues, are the simplicity of the
narrative, the availability of easily recognizable and likeable icons and sym-
bols, the level of risk associated with active involvement in the campaign, and
the congruence, or lack thereof, of the campaign with broader regime narra-
tives.44 Therefore, social media campaigns that use simplistic ‘‘hero vs. vil-
lain’’ or ‘‘David vs. Goliath’’ narratives and ask for low-risk participation, like
donating a coin for a popular cause such as saving the Anti-Corruption
Commission (#SaveKPK), are more likely to generate widespread support
than an appeal for solidarity with socially marginalized groups like religious or
sexual minorities.
Activists from electoral movements who seek to mobilize large numbers of
otherwise politically apathetic citizens face very similar constraints, regardless
of how much of their campaign is fought online and how much on the
ground. Put simply, people are unlikely to sacriﬁce time and resources for
an uncharismatic party apparatchik with a history of vote-buying and corrup-
tion. In the case of Jokowi, the campaigns in 2012 and 2014 quickly gained
momentum because the candidate was both charismatic and likeable, his
campaign message was simplistic in the extreme, and his background as a polit-
ical outsider from Solo predestined him for the role of David in his electoral
contests against the Goliaths Fauzi Bowo and Prabowo Subianto. Moreover,
the Jokowi movements supported, rather than challenged, the dominant polit-
ical meta-narrative of reformasi [reform], which had underpinned Indonesia’s
43. Merlyna Lim, ‘‘Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia,’’ Journal
of Contemporary Asia 43:4 (2013): 636–57.
44. Ibid.
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democratic regime since 1998 but was now increasingly imperiled by the
maneuvers of conservative elites intent on rolling back some of Indonesia’s
democratic achievements. Thus, while Jokowi’s opponents in the two elections
threatened to either exacerbate the growing sense of democratic stagnation
(Fauzi Bowo in Jakarta in 2012) or implement changes in the regime structure
which many deemed too radical (Prabowo in the presidential election of 2014),
the soft-spoken Jokowi offered the prospect of salvaging the existing regime
from these threats without simply continuing with business as usual.
How important it can be to avoid challenging dominant meta-narratives
became obvious in the 2017 Jakarta election when the activists of Teman
Ahok failed to resurrect the spirit of the previous campaigns in a new move-
ment to support Jokowi’s former deputy, Ahok. Although Teman Ahok
gained signiﬁcant momentum in 2015 and 2016, its members struggled to
get important elements of the pro-Jokowi movements to support them.
Especially pro-democracy and human rights activists, who had been so pro-
minent in the Jokowi campaigns, remained lukewarm in their support for
Ahok because of his ruthless evictions of poor neighborhoods in Jakarta. But
the biggest obstacles to a genuine pro-Ahok movement were the governor’s
Christian religion and Chinese ethnicity. Representing not one but two
minorities, Ahok was simply not that easy to sell to ordinary voters. It was
therefore not surprising that Teman Ahok’s work was effectively undone when
Ahok made insensitive remarks about the Holy Qur’an in late 2016. With
many Muslims interpreting the remarks as blasphemous, Ahok very suddenly
turned from a popular maverick politician to an enemy of Indonesia’s hege-
monic religion. This made him an easy target for hardline Islamists, who then
used religious and racist narratives to build their own electoral movement.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has outlined how new forms of political activism are redeﬁning
the nexus between formal electoral politics and informal movement politics
in Indonesia. Though electoral campaigning has not yet morphed into the
kind of bottom-up, citizen-initiated campaigning that has become prominent
in established democracies like the United States or the United Kingdom,45
45. Rachel K. Gibson, ‘‘Party Change, Social Media and the Rise of ‘Citizen-Initiated’ Cam-
paigning,’’ Party Politics 21:2 (2015): 183–97.
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the Indonesian case demonstrates that even in countries with lower socio-
economic standards and less institutionalized political systems, electoral cam-
paigning is increasingly driven by the political activism of non-party groups.
Electoral movements that form in support of or in opposition to individual
candidates have not only introduced new forms of collective action that shape
electoral campaigns and results; they have also emerged as an important
avenue for mobilization and fundraising. However, up until now, these
trends have been conﬁned to national-level elections and local elections in
the capital, Jakarta.
This article has traced the evolution of this new form of political activism
through three important elections, the Jakarta gubernatorial elections in 2012
and 2017, and the presidential election in 2014. All three saw enormous levels
of political activism, which not only changed the nature of campaigning in
Indonesia but also challenged the role of political parties and inﬂuenced the
outcomes of the electoral contests. Signiﬁcantly, in the ﬁrst two elections, the
beneﬁciary of this activism—Jokowi—was a candidate who deﬁed wide-
spread stereotypical perceptions of Indonesian politicians as selﬁsh, greedy,
and untrustworthy. Thus, he embodied a deeply rooted public desire for
a just and honest politician who would cleanse the system of its multiple
pathologies and take care of the concerns of ordinary people. In short, Jokowi
in 2012 and 2014 fulﬁlled all the contingencies that need to be in place for
these kinds of campaigns to be successful. Ahok in 2017 was not the same
kind of likeable outsider. The combined effects of his brash political style and
his background as an ethnic-Chinese Christian proved to be a deterrent, not
a drawing card, for many voters.
The success of the anti-Ahok campaign has raised fears that the presiden-
tial election in 2019 will also be marred by sectarian propaganda and mobi-
lization, this time targeted at Jokowi. This anticipated smear campaign
therefore looms as one of the main challenges for Jokowi if he does, as is
widely expected, run for a second term. In tackling this challenge, however,
the president is unlikely to enjoy the levels of mass mobilization he did in
2012 and 2014, because many of his activist supporters have been disap-
pointed by his performance in ofﬁce so far. Moreover, as incumbent presi-
dent, Jokowi will ﬁnd it far more difﬁcult to play the outsider card.
But even if the 2019 election does not see a revival of the pro-Jokowi
movement, the progressive volunteer activism that shaped the 2012 and
2014 elections is likely to leave its mark on the next presidential election.
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Jokowi’s campaign team for 2019, for example, may well adopt at least some
of the strategies that were pioneered by pro-Jokowi volunteers in previous
elections. Parties, meanwhile, will seek to regain the ground they lost to the
volunteers in 2014, and Jokowi himself will do his best to ensure that the
parties that nominate him in 2019 are more committed to supporting his
candidacy than PDIP was in 2014.
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